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Abstract A key question in the literature on factive Weak Islands has been whether
the effect is syntactic or semantic. Since Szabolcsi & Zwarts (1993), a key argument
for the semantic nature of Weak Islands is the observation that the effect requires
not just factivity, but also that the property described by the embedded clause is
non-iterable with respect to the extracted argument (uniqueness). We present two
caveats concerning the notion of factivity needed in meaning-based approaches.
First, we present novel data on factive non-islands showing that certain lexically
factive verbs do not (always) lead to islandhood when combined with uniqueness.
Second, recalling data from Cattell (1978), we argue that certain non-factive islands
can be captured by the same meaning-based explanation. The emerging picture is
that lexical factivity of the embedding verb is neither necessary nor sufficient to
induce weak islands in combination with uniqueness; rather, what matters is whether
or not there is a contextual entailment, pragmatic or lexical, that the complement
proposition is true.
Keywords: weak islands, factive islands, response stance verbs, presupposition, extraction
1 Introduction
Since the seminal work by Ross (1984), it is known that extraction is constrained in
certain configurations called ‘islands’. While strong islands always block extraction
regardless of what kind of phrase is extracted, weak islands have been observed to
allow extraction in some cases but not in others, as in (1)-(3):
(1) Weak island: Whether-island
a. Which topici did John ask [whether to talk about ti]?
b. * How did John ask [whether to behave ti]?
c. * Why did John ask [whether Mary complained ti]?
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(2) Weak island: Negative island
a. I asked which topici John didn’t talk about ti?
b. * I asked how John didn’t behave ti?
c. * I asked why John didn’t [complain ti]?
(3) Weak island: Factive island
a. Which topici do you regret [that John talk about ti]?
b. *? How do you regret [that John behaved ti]?
c. * Why do you regret [that Mary complained ti]?
Weak islands may be induced by different elements, e.g. by a whether-question
in (1), by negation in (2) and by the complement of a factive attitude verb in (3).1 In
this paper, we concentrate on so-called ‘factive’ islands like (3). To see the effect of
factivity in closer detail, compare the (a)-variants below containing a lexically factive
like know, which selectively blocks extraction, with the (b)-variants containing a
non-factive verb like think, which freely allows extraction:
(4) a. To which student does John know [that Mary showed this letter ti]? [+fact]
b. To which student does John think [that Mary showed this letter ti]? [−fact]
(5) a. *? Howi does Max know [that Alice went to San Francisco ti]? [+fact]
b. Howi does Max think [that Alice went to San Francisco ti]? [−fact]
(6) a. * Whyi does Max know [that Alice insulted Pat ti]? [+fact]
b. Whyi does Max think [that Alice insulted Pat ti]? [−fact]
In early work, the contrast among different phrases extracted out of a weak island
was attributed to their argumental status: argument wh-phrases can be extracted,
e.g. out of the factive island in (4a), whereas adjunct wh-phrases cannot, as seen in
(5a)-(6a) (Huang 1982; Lasnik & Saito 1984, 1994). The explanations sought were
rooted in syntactic differences between arguments and adjuncts.
However, later work noted that the relevant distinction is more nuanced. Sz-
abolcsi & Zwarts (1993) observed that argument extraction out of the complement
of a (lexically) factive verb leads to ungrammaticality in certain cases too, namely,
when the event described in the embedded clause is non-iterable with respect to
the extracted argument. The contrast is illustrated in (7): Extraction is grammatical
in (7a), where the embedded property [λx.you have shown this letter to x] may be
iterated over several individuals, whereas extraction leads to ungrammaticality in
(7b), where the embedded property [λx.you have gotten this letter from x] applies
uniquely, i.e., cannot hold of more than one individual:
1 See Szabolcsi (2006) for an overview.
185
Djärv and Romero
(7) Szabolcsi & Zwarts (1993: 271)
a. To whomi do you regret [having shown this letter ti]?
b. *From whomi do you regret [having gotten this letter ti]?
Generalizing the pattern, Oshima (2007) argued that extraction of why always leads to
an embedded unique, non-iterable property, thus rendering extraction ungrammatical.
Similarly, he argued that extraction of how tends to be interpreted as leading to an
embedded unique property as well, with the same ungrammatical result.
These and other observations have led to a new research line of meaning-based
explanations of factive islands (Szabolcsi & Zwarts 1993, 1997; Abrusán 2011;
Oshima 2007; Schwarz & Simonenko 2018; Schwarz, Oshima & Simonenko 2019:
a.o.). The goal of the present paper is to present two caveats concerning the notion
of factivity needed in meaning-based approaches. We illustrate these two caveats
for Schwarz & Simonenko (2018)’s approach, but they in principle apply to other
meaning-based approaches capitalizing on factivity. First, we present novel data
on factive non-islands showing that certain lexically factive verbs do not (always)
lead to islandhood when combined with uniqueness. Second, recalling data from
Cattell (1978), we argue that certain non-factive islands should receive the same
meaning-based explanation. The emerging picture is that lexical factivity of the
embedding verb is neither necessary nor sufficient to induce weak islandhood in
combination with uniqueness; rather, what matters is whether or not there is a
contextual entailment, pragmatic or lexical, that the complement proposition is true.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines Schwarz
& Simonenko (2018)’s meaning-based analysis of factive islands. Section 3 presents
the two challenges: factive non-islands and non-factive islands. In section 4, we
show how these two challenges are overcome once lexical factivity is replaced by
the more flexible notion of contextual entailment. In section 5, the meaning-based
approach is extended to cases involving other presupposition triggers. Section 6
concludes.
2 The meaning-based approach by Schwarz & Simonenko (2018)
Schwarz & Simonenko (2018) derive the selective ungrammaticality of factive
islands from the consequences that the combination of factivity and uniqueness has
for the felicity conditions of questions. The crucial contrast is recapitulated in (8). If
the embedding verb is factive –e.g. know– and the "gapped" property resulting from
extraction is unique –e.g. [λx.λw. Caesar was murdered in x in w] can be true of
at most one location at any given w–, the sentence in ungrammatical, as in (8a). If
factitivy is removed –e.g. by using non-factive think–, the sentence is grammatical,
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as in (8b). Alternatively, if the embedded gapped property is non-unique, as in (8c),
the result is also grammatical.
(8) Schwarz, Oshima & Simonenko (2019: 529–530)
a. *Wherei did they know that Caesar was murdered ti? [+fact,+uni]
b. Wherei did they think that Caesar was murdered ti? [−fact,+uni]
c. Wherei did they know that Caesar had sent troops ti? [+fact,−uni]
Let us consider first what effect the combination of factivity and uniqueness has
on the context set c that serves as input to the question. Take R to stand for the
property in the restrictor of the wh-phrase, S to be the property in the nuclear scope
and P to be the embedded gapped property, as exemplified in (9). Given that the
gapped clause entails uniqueness of P and that the embedding verb, being factive,
presupposes the truth of its complement clause, the matrix IP as a whole presupposes
uniqueness of P. This is then combined with a Hamblin/Karttunen-style semantics
for questions, whereby a question denotes the set of its possible answers (Hamblin
1973; Karttunen 1977). Each possible answer will presuppose uniqueness of P, as
sketched in the question intension schema (9d). As a consequence, the question as a
whole will presuppose uniqueness of P, leading to the result in (10): For each world
w in the context set c, there is at most one proposition in the question’s denotation
whose presupposition is true at w.
(9) * Where / In which place did they know that Caesar was murdered?
a. R: λx.λw. x is a place in w
b. S: λx.λw: Caesar was murdered in x in w. they believe that Caesar was
murdered in x in w
c. P: λx.λw. Caesar was murdered in x in w
d. λw. {λw’: P(x)(w’). S(x)(w’) ∣ R(x)(w)}
(10) Consequence of factivity plus uniqueness:
c ⊆ {w: ∣{p: p ∈ Q(w) ∧ w ∈ dom(p)}∣ ≤ 1}
We turn now to two felicity conditions for questions invoked in Schwarz &
Simonenko (2018)’s account. The first one, dubbed Answerability Condition and
stated in (11), requires that the context set c be consistent with the question having
an answer p which is informative –i.e., not yet entailed by c (c ⊈ p)– and whose
presupposition is met (c ⊆ dom(p)). The second felicity condition is an existence
presupposition argued to arise in wh-questions (Dayal 1996; Abusch 2010): A wh-
question presupposes that there is at least one true answer in the denoted Hamblin
set, as in (12):
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(11) Felicity condition 1: Answerability Condition
A question Q is felicitous in a context c only if
∃p [ ∃w [w ∈ c ∧ p ∈ Q(w)] ∧ c ⊆ dom(p) ∧ c ⊈ p ]
(12) Felicity condition 2: ∃-presupposition
A question Q is felicitous in a context c only if
c ⊆ {w: ∃p [p ∈ Q(w) ∧ p(w)]}
Schwarz & Simonenko (2018) show that, in a question involving factivity and
uniqueness, these two felicity conditions lead to contradictory demands, so that
there is no possible context set c that satisfies them both. To see this, consider the
three toy context sets below, with the extension of the properties R, S and P from
(9) specified for each w in the context set and where there are only two locations
altogether, namely, Rome (r) and Alexandria (a). In the case of (13), the context
set c contains two worlds: one in which Caesar was murdered in Rome and they
believe so, and one in which Caesar was murdered in Alexandria and they equally
believe so. This context set c violates the presupposition part of the Answerability
Condition (11), since there is no p in the denotation Q(w) under some w in c such
that the presupposition of that p is entailed by the (entire) context set.




A similar fate awaits context set (14). Here, it is already settled in the context set
that Caesar was murdered in Rome and that they believe so. The informativity part
of the Answerability Condition fails: Though there is a possible answer p whose
presupposition is entailed by the (entire) c –namely, [λw: Caesar was murdered in r
in w. they believe that Caesar was murdered in r in w]–, p itself is entailed by c and
thus it is not informative.
(14) c = { wR∶{r,a}, P∶{r}, S∶{r} }
The final case, in (15), involves a context set that entails that Caesar was murdered
in Rome but leaves open whether they believe so or they do not believe of any
particular place x that Caesar was murdered in x. This time, the Answerability
Condition is fully satisfied, since we can find a possible answer –again, [λw: Caesar
was murdered in r in w. they believe that Caesar was murdered in r in w]– whose
presupposition is satisfied by the (entire) context set and whose at-issue contribution
is still informative. However, the Existence Presupposition is not met, since c –via
the world listed first– is consistent with there being no true answer in Q(w).
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In the following section, we discuss two potential challenges for a meaning-
driven account to factive islands.
3 Two potential challenges
3.1 Factive non-islands
We start by observing that there are cases where extraction is possible in environ-
ments that are strictly +Factive and +Unique, as shown in (16).
(16) Big news! Archaeologists reveal new facts about the life and death of Caesar
a. So tell me – where did they {discover, learn} that Caesar was killed?
b. Hey – do you know who they just found out that Caesar was killed by?
Here, it looks like the meaning-based approach is too strong, in that it seems to
over-generate weak island contexts. At first glance, what seems to be going on in
these examples is that the presuppositional part (c ⊆ dom(p)) of the Answerability
Condition (11) is not met; clearly, the reason for asking these questions is that the
context does not entail, for any specific location x, that Caesar was killed in that
location x.
Does that then mean that the Answerability Condition is not in fact a felicity
condition on questions? Not necessarily: it seems like the principle is generally
motivated. For instance, an information-seeking question like (17) seems to require
that the context entails (not just that one but) that all of the individuals satisfying the
restrictor property R –here, the property ‘being one of our five zebras’– also satisfy
the property ‘being female’ arising from the presupposition triggers herself and her
(Schlenker 2008; Theiler 2021):
(17) Which of our five zebras let herself out of her enclosure?
Instead, we will argue, in section 4.1 that the explanation for why the questions in
(16) are acceptable lies in the observation that cognitive factives like discover and
find out more generally allow for parenthetical uses, in which p is not treated as part
of the common ground (see, among others, Urmson 1952; Simons 2007, and Djärv
2019, for discussion):
(18) Big news! Archaeologists reveal new facts about the life and death of Caesar.
They just {found out, discovered, learned} that Caesar was actually killed in
the Theatre of Pompey! (And not in the regular Senate Building.)
In such cases, the speaker does not treat p as being part of the common ground;
rather, the function of an utterance like that in (18) is to add the proposition that
189
Djärv and Romero
Caesar was killed in the Theatre of Pompey to the common ground, as discourse
new information. Nevertheless, as shown in (19), the sentence still differs from its
corresponding non-factive sentence, in that p is still entailed:
(19) Big news! Archaeologists reveal new facts about the life and death of Caesar.
a. They just {found out, discovered, learned} that Caesar was actually killed
in the Theatre of Pompey. (#Though he was in fact killed in the regular
Senate Building.)
b. They {think, are saying} that Caesar was actually killed in the Theatre of
Pompey. (Though he was in fact killed in the regular Senate Building.)
The same is true for the corresponding question. In asking (16), the speaker still
assumes that the location where the archaeologists discovered that Caesar was killed
is the place where Caesar was in fact killed (in the evaluation world). This is unlike
the corresponding question involving a non-factive verb (20), which also has this
type of evidential use – though a weaker one than the factive question: here, the
speaker does not assume that the location where the archaeologists think that Caesar
was killed is necessarily the place where Caesar was killed.
(20) Big news! Archaeologists reveal new facts about the life and death of Caesar.
So tell me – where do they {think, believe} that Caesar was killed?
It is well-documented that emotive factives like regret and appreciate do not
generally allow for the kinds of parenthetical uses illustrated in (18), but impose a
stronger requirement that p be common ground (see Djärv 2019 for experimental
results corroborating this contrast between cognitive and emotive factives).
(21) Big news! Archaeologists reveal new facts about the life and death of Caesar.
#They {resent, appreciate, are happy} that Caesar was actually killed in the
Theatre of Pompey.
We thus expect that questions involving emotive factives should not be rescued by
the kinds of evidential questions illustrated in (16); a prediction which is borne out:
(22) Big news! Archaeologists reveal new facts about the life and death of Caesar.
#So tell me – where do they {regret, appreciate} that Caesar was killed?
To summarize this section, questions containing a factive verb can ‘escape’
meaning-driven ungrammaticality in (at least) two ways: either via non-uniqueness,
as in (8c), or via an ‘evidential question’ (if the factive verb permits), as in (16). In
the following section, we discuss a second caveat regarding the precise notion of
factivity that is relevant to weak island effects: non-factive (attitude) islands. We
also include a brief discussion of how previous proposals have dealt with these cases.
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3.2 Non-factive islands
A perhaps more serious challenge for the type of meaning-based approach discussed
here is that it appears to under-generate weak island environments. Since Cattell
(1978), it has been observed that factive verbs are only one type of attitude verb
that gives rise to weak island effects. As illustrated in (23), Cattell’s (1978) class of
response stance verbs (i.e. non-factive verbs like admit, accept, deny) are also weak
island inducers:
(23) Szabolcsi (2006: 508)
Howi did you {think, *realize, *accept} that he behaved ti?
Unlike realize, discover, know and find out, etc., accept is not lexically factive,
as illustrated by (24):2
(24) I don’t believe [that Caesar was killed in the Temple of Jupiter]i, but I will
accept iti for the purpose of this conversation.
This observation has lead a number of researchers, including Melvold (1991);
Hegarty (1992); Roussou (1994), and more recently Haegeman & Ürögdi (2010) and
Kastner (2015), to focus not on the factive presupposition per se, but rather point to
the ‘nominal’ or ‘definite’ character of the types of predicates that give rise to weak
island effects (building on insights from Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1970).
Among these accounts, there are two main lines of analysis. On one type of
analysis, the weak island effects receive a syntactic (Relativized Minimality) ex-
planation: complements of verbs like deny and regret have a null operator in their
left-periphery, which serve as an intervener for A-bar extraction, and additionally
gives rise to the types of pragmatic “definiteness” effects associated with comple-
ments of factive and response stance verbs (see for instance Progovac 1988; Melvold
1991; Hegarty 1992; Watanabe 1993; Zubizarreta 2001; Roussou 1994, and more
recently Haegeman & Ürögdi 2010). The problem for this type of approach is that it
is not built to account for the uniqueness-effects illustrated in (7)–(8) in section 1, as
these are associated with the semantic content of the embedded clause.
The second type of account is primarily associated with Honcoop (1998), and
has been adopted more recently in work by Kastner (2015), who provides a concrete
syntactic scaffolding for Honcoop’s (1998) semantic proposal. On this account, com-
plements of factive and response stance verbs are both part of a more general class
of presuppositional verbs, which embed (or, for Kastner, select) for presuppositional
clauses, in the sense that they pick out a discourse referent in the common ground
2 The same is more obviously true for negative response stance verbs like doubt and deny. These may
fall, though, under negative weak islands, for which other meaning-based explanations have been
proposed (Rullmann 1995; Fox & Hackl 2006; Abrusán 2011: a.o.).
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(for Kastner, such complements are additionally headed by a null D-layer). Just
like the syntactic accounts discussed in the previous paragraph treat weak islands in
terms of intervention effects, Honcoop treat weak islands in terms of scope effects,
building on Szabolcsi & Zwarts (1993). Honcoop’s (1998) proposal is couched
within the framework of Dynamic Semantics, and is motivated by the observation
that the expressions that lead to scope islands also give rise to so-called inaccessibil-
ity effects, in terms of being able to introduce a discourse referent that can be picked
up by cross-sentential anaphora, as illustrated in (25).
(25) Cross-sentential anaphora & scope islands (Honcoop 1998: 4, 17)
a. John {has, *doesn’t have} a cari. Iti is expensive.
b. Howi {did, *didn’t} he behave ti?
Taking so-called what-for NPinde f split constructions in Germanic as a core case
of weak island sensitive expressions, Honcoop proposes to reduce the explanation
of weak (scope) island effects to that of the anaphora facts: in (25a), the negative
operator creates an inaccessible domain for the indefinite NP a car to dynamically
bind the non-c-commanded pronoun it. The key assumption is that the mechanism
that allows for this dynamic binding (Dekker’s 1993 Existential Disclosure) is only
available in contexts that allow cross-sentential anaphora. Honcoop’s prediction is
therefore that negative and other operators, which block cross-sentential anaphora
(as shown in (25a)), should also give rise to weak island effects in what-for NPinde f
split constructions and other weak island sensitive expressions.
As Honcoop himself points out, however, the parallel between cross-sentential
anaphora and weak islands runs into problems in the case of presuppositional attitude
islands. As illustrated in (26), the verbs that give rise to inaccessible domains are
not the same as those that give rise to weak island effects: there are some non-
island inducers which constitute inaccessible domains for dynamic anaphora (like
think and believe), and conversely, there are island inducers which do not constitute
inaccessible domains (like be happy, remember, and know):
(26) Adapted from Honcoop (1998: 168)
John {*thought, is happy} that he saw a birdi today. Iti was blue.
To capture the presence vs. absence of weak island effects with the two sets
of verbs, Honcoop introduces an intensionalized version of Existential Disclosure,
which is able to capture the lack of weak island effects with verbs like think.
Crucially, this requires that p is introduced as a new discourse referent. Honcoop
argues that the mechanism which prevents weak island effects with verbs like think
is not applicable to factive and response stance verbs, as these verbs require p to be
old information, referring back to previous discourse referents, rather than creating
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new ones. Like the proposals discussed above, Honcoop (1998: 179–180) also draws
an explicit parallel between the two types of attitude verbs and (in)definitness in the
nominal domain.
The main problem for this type of approach, as for the syntactic accounts dis-
cussed above, is that it doesn’t provide a mechanism for dealing with the type of
uniqueness-effects discussed here.3 Nevertheless, we agree with the core insight
of the proposals discussed here, that the discourse status of p matters for the weak
island effect. However, rather than linking the effect to the syntactic properties of the
embedded clause, or to anaphoric binding (and/or selection), we will argue that this
insight can also be captured within Schwarz & Simonenko’s (2018) meaning-based
account, once we adopt a broader notion of contextual entailment. This will allow us
to account for both the uniqueness-effects illustrated in (8), and the observation from
this and the previous section, that lexical factivity is neither necessary nor sufficient.
4 Proposal: Contextual entailment instead of presupposition
Taken together, the data discussed here has shown us that the factive weak island
effects are both more pervasive, and at the same time less robust, than has been
assumed on previous accounts. In order to capture the distribution of the weak island
effects across embedding and pragmatic contexts, we argue that meaning-based
approaches like Schwarz & Simonenko (2018)’s must loosen the notion of factivity
in favour of a broader notion of pragmatically or lexically triggered contextual
entailment.
4.1 Accounting for factive non-islands within the meaning-based account
In section 3.1, we saw that factive verbs may fail to give rise to weak island effects
in so-called ‘evidential questions’ like (16), despite being lexically +factive and
+unique. This, we suggest, is not because the Answerability Condition (11) is not
required to be met, but because certain factives allow for a kind of evidential use
where the context does not have to entail p, as already observed in previous work for
cases where these verbs combine with declarative complements, as in (18). Hence,
the interpretation we get with these evidential uses is the presupposition-less question
What is the location x s.t. they discovered that Caesar was killed in x?, as shown in
(27):
3 As Szabolcsi (2006: 526) points out, this account also has no clear way of explaining the weak island
sensitivity found with the (arguably related) cases of how and why-questions; in the sense that it’s not
clear why they would be assimilated to split constructions, under the Existential Disclosure approach.
A similar point is also made in Abrusán (2011: fn. 3, 263).
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(27) J(16a)=Where did they discover that Caesar was killed?K =
{λw. they discoveredw that Caesar was killed in the Theatre of Pompey,
λw. they discoveredw that Caesar was killed in the Senate Building,
λw. they discoveredw that Caesar was killed in the Basilica Porcia, . . . }
This, then, is similar to the corresponding non-factive question Where do they
think that Caesar was killed?, which also lacks a presupposition (though as we saw
in section 3.1, the two questions differ in terms of veridicality).
(28) J(20)=Where do they think that Caesar was killed?K =
{λw. they thinkw that Caesar was killed in the Theatre of Pompey,
λw. they thinkw that Caesar was killed in the Senate Building,
λw. they thinkw that Caesar was killed in the Basilica Porcia, . . . }
For concreteness, we can model such evidential uses either in terms of Heim’s
(1983) local accommodation or as a back/fore-grounded entailment, as in Simons,
Beaver, Roberts & Tonhauser (2017).4 What matters for current purposes is simply
the lack of global presupposition projection in these cases. Without a global pre-
supposition of p, the absence of weak island effects in questions like (16), which
involve factive verbs like find out and discover in +unique contexts, directly fol-
lows from the meaning-based approach. In section 2, we saw that in a question
involving factivity and uniqueness (see (8a) and (9)), the two felicity conditions on
questions –the Answerability Condition in (11) and the Existential Presupposition in
(12)– lead to contradictory demands, so that there is no possible context set c that
satisfies both conditions. In the case of the evidential questions in (16), however,
given that no presupposition projects, the presuppositional part (c ⊆ dom(p)) of the
Answerability Condition in (11) is trivially satisfied. Thus, the only requirement
imposed by the Answerability Condition is that the question has an answer p which
is informative in c. As a result, the weakened Answerability Condition and the
Existence Presupposition do not lead to contradictory demands.
Thus, with this small adjustment about our assumptions about the pragmatics of
factive verbs, we capture the observation that questions involving factive verbs may
escape the island-effects also in these kinds of evidential contexts, in addition to in
non-unique contexts.
4.2 Accounting for non-factive islands within the meaning-based account
Regarding the presence of weak island effects with non-factive verbs like admit, it
has been observed since Karttunen (1977) that these verbs do tend to project a fairly
strong, though defeasible, not-at issue pragmatic veridical inference:
4 Another recent alternative comes from Djärv (2019), who provides an account of factivity where p is
neither a lexical presupposition nor a backgrounded entailment.
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(29) a. She didn’t admit that [p Caesar was killed in the Theatre of Pompey]. ↝ p
b. Did she admit that [p Caesar was killed in the Theatre of Pompey]? ↝ p
This observation is also supported by experimental data from German, English,
and Swedish in Djärv (2019: Ch. 3.2), showing that participants rated the positive
response stance verbs accept and admit close to lexically (cognitive and emotive)
factive verbs, in terms of perceived speaker commitment to p, in both embedded and
unembedded environments.
At this point, one might be tempted to suggest that verbs like accept and admit
are actually just factive, an alternative which would immediately take care of the
problem. However, as we saw in (24) above, there are clear differences between
these verbs, and lexically factive verbs like discover, in terms of the defeasibil-
ity/cancellability of the p-inference in unembedded contexts. Instead, we follow
Anand & Hacquard (2014), who argue that verbs like admit create an illusion of
factivity, stemming from the fact that they report discourse moves that the describe
acceptance of p in the reported common ground. If the reported conversational
context is taken to be representative of the actual conversational context (in the
evaluation world), then “acceptance of p can easily bleed into the actual common
ground, under the assumption that no subsequent move removed p from the com-
mon ground: an illusion of factivity arises whenever a reported context is taken to
faithfully represent the conversational community in the world of evaluation.” (p.
74–75). In (30), p projects because we conventionally take the book to be making its
acknowledgement in a conversational context that includes the participants of the
actual context. Crucially, however, as shown in (31), with sufficient ‘epistemological
distance’ between the contexts, the illusion of factivity disappears:
(30) Anand & Hacquard (2014: 74)
Does the book {acknowledge, admit, confirm} that Mary is the murderer?
↝Mary is the murderer
(31) Anand & Hacquard (2014: 75)
In Ancient Greece it was widely accepted that the Earth was flat. Eratosthenes
however thought that it was round. After his peers demonstrated to him that
he couldn’t be right, he finally {acknowledged/admitted} that the Earth was
flat.   The Earth was flat.
We propose that it is this factive-like inference that is the cause of the weak
island effects observed with these non-factive verbs. Our claim is that, as a default,
questions with admit-verbs are interpreted against a context that entails p. In such
cases, the question will encounter both uniqueness and a factive like-inference (see
(9)–(10)), and thus necessarily violate either felicity condition in (11)–(12), as we
saw in section 2.
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5 Extending the scope of the theory
The keystone of the meaning-based approach to factive islands by Schwarz &
Simonenko (2018) rests on the presence of a unique, non-iterable “gapped” property
in the presuppositional core of the question, as sketched in (32). In their account, this
presupposition is triggered by the factivity of the embedding attitude verb. Section 4
discussed the nature of the implication containing the “gapped” property, showing
that it doesn’t require a lexically factive verb: a pragmatic contextual inference with
the same content suffices to create a weak island. In the present section, we will see
that, besides factive verbs, other types of presupposition-triggers –e.g. again– also
give rise to the same type of weak-islandhood effects.
(32) λw. {λw’: Punique(x)(w’). S(x)(w’) ∣ R(x)(w)}
We start with an iterable, non-unique property, e.g. [λx. λw you invitedw x] in
(33). This sentence allows for an underlying LF structure where the presupposition
trigger again scopes over the trace of the extracted phrase, as in (33a). This results
in the question meaning in (33b), asking for the person(s) x such that, after you
invited x before t, you invited x at the relevant time t too. Since uniqueness is not at
play, no conflict arises between the Answerability Condition (11) and the Existence
Presupposition (12) and the extraction is acceptable.
(33) Who did you invite again?
a. LF: [CP Whoi [ [ you invited ti] again (at time t) ] ]
b. λw. {λw’: you invitedw′ x before t . you invitedw′ x at t ∣ person(x)(w)}
Now consider the unique property that –following Oshima (2007)– is obtained
when extracting a how-phrase, e.g. the property [λx. λw you fixed-carw in manner
x] in (34). A parallel structure where again scopes over the trace of how, as in LF1
in (34a), leads to ungrammaticality. This can be seen in that the resulting reading
(34b) –asking for the manner x such that, after you fixed the car in manner x before
t, you fixed the car in manner x at t as well– is not available. Instead, the only
reading acceptable is (34d), roughly paraphrasable as ‘Granted that the car was fixed
before t. How did you fix it at t?’. This reading corresponds to LF2 in (34c), where,
crucially, again does not have the trace of how in its scope and, thus, there is no
extraction across a potential island-inducer:
(34) How did you fix the car again?
a. LF1: *? [CP Howi [ [ you fixed the car ti] again (at time t) ] ]
b. *? λw. {λw’: you fixed-carw′ in manner x before t . you fixed-carw′ in
manner x at t ∣ manner(x)(w)}
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c. LF2: [CP Howi [ [ you fixed the car] again ti (at time t)] ]
d. λw. {λw’: you fixed-carw′ before t . you fixed-carw′ in manner x at t ∣
manner(x)(w)}
The same considerations apply when the unique “gapped” property results –
again following Oshima (2007)– from the extraction of why in (35). LF1 in (35a)
where again scopes over the trace is ungrammatical, since the corresponding reading
(35b) is unavailable. This reading can be roughly paraphrased as ‘For what reason
x, after Bill came for reason x before t, Bill came for reason x at t’. The only
available reading is given in (35d), paraphrasable as ‘Granted that Bill came before
t. For what reason did he come at t?’. The latter reading follows from LF2 in (35c),
where, crucially, again does not include the trace of why in its scope and, hence, no
extraction out of a potential island is taking place:
(35) Why did Bill come again?
a. LF1: * [CP Whyi [ [ Bill came ti] again (at time t) ] ]
b. * λw. {λw’: Bill camew′ for reason x before t . Bill camew′ for reason x at
t ∣ reason(x)(w)}
c. LF2: [CP Whyi [ [ Bill came] again ti (at time t)] ]
d. λw. {λw’: Bill camew′ before t . Bill camew′ for reason x at t ∣ reason(x)(w)}
This means that extraction from the scope of the presupposition trigger again
induces the same kind of selective weak island as extraction from the complement of
a lexically factive verb like know. The approach by Schwarz & Simonenko (2018),
when applied to these new cases, directly derives the desired results. Regardless
of what the trigger of the presupposition is, what matters in their approach is
having a unique “gapped” property in the presuppositional core, which brings the
Answerability Condition (11) and the Existence Presupposition (12) to conflicting
requirements.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we have argued that what matters for the meaning-based approach to
factive weak islands is contextual entailment, which is a broader notion than lexical
factivity. Building on insights by accounts appealing to the discourse status of p, we
showed that, viewed as a case of pragmatic contextual entailment, we can capture
the weak island-insensitivity of factives like discover in evidential questions and
the weak island-sensitivity of non-factives like admit, within the meaning-based
approach of Schwarz & Simonenko (2018). Additionally, we have shown that a
meaning-based approach like theirs can also be extended to cases where the weak
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